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EXPORT-PROMOTING 
TRADE STRATEGY 
Issues and Evidence 
Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
T-he question of the wisdom of adopting an export-promoting 
trade strategy has recurred in the history of the developing 
countries. Development economics was born in an atmosphere 
of export pessimism at the end of the World War II. By the late 1960s, 
however, the remarkable success of the few economies that pursued 
"export-promoting" (EP) rather than "import-substituting" (Is) policies 
swung the weight of academic opinion behind the EP strategy. Aiding 
this process were numerous academic findings from research projects 
around the world, which investigated both these EP successes and the 
failures of the is countries.1 
The debt crisis of the 1980s, the sluggish world economy, and the 
continuing depression of primary product prices have revived export 
pessimism afresh. It is time again, therefore, to examine the old and 
new arguments that question the wisdom of the EP strategy. 
The early postwar arguments in support of export pessimism are 
briefly reviewed below, before the precise content of an EP strategy is 
stated. The article then considers a few salient lessons that have 
emerged in the studies on the advantages of the EP strategy and 
examines several new sources of skepticism concerning export-prom- 
oting trade policies. The contrasts between the old (postwar) pessi- 
mism and the new pessimism prevalent today are then exploited 
briefly to draw a central policy lesson for the developing countries, 




It is well known that export pessimism characterized the thinking 
of most influential development economists and policymakers in the 
developing countries after World War II. The most articulate pro- 
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ponents of the pessimist school of thought were the two great 
pioneers of development economics: Raul Prebisch (see Prebisch 1952 
and 1984) and Ragnar Nurkse (see Nurkse 1959). Their diagnoses, 
however, had significant differences. 
Prebisch considered the terms of trade of primary products, then 
the chief exports of developing countries, to be declining regardless of 
the policies of the developing countries. Left to themselves, producers 
in the developing countries would have responded to this secular price 
shift by industrializing, which would make (trade tariff) protection or 
(domestic subsidy) promotion unnecessary and unjustified.3 By con- 
trast, Nurkse's export pessimism arose from the notion that foreign 
markets simply could not accommodate imports on a sufficient scale 
as developing countries accelerated their development. Therefore, ex- 
port pessimism explicitly meant "elasticity" pessimism, and the case 
for government intervention then follows.4 Nurkse, therefore, advo- 
cated what he called a policy of "balanced growth." 
Paradoxically, however, Nurkse was mindful of the costs of indis- 
criminate protectionism, as he had also written about the collapse of 
the world trading system during the 1930s (Nurkse 1953). "Balanced 
growth" could only mean government incentives to assist industriali- 
zation, a prescription that appears to have combined uneasily with the 
caveats that Nurkse expressed about protection. By contrast, Pre- 
bisch's brand of pessimism did not justify protectionism but was 
nevertheless widely used by his followers to do so in Latin America. 
The export pessimism of these influential economists was cast in 
the mold of natural forces and phenomena that the developing coun- 
tries faced. Nurkse, for instance, wrote about increasing economy in 
the use of raw materials and a shift further from natural to synthetic 
materials, both dampening the demand for developing countries' ex- 
ports over time. Developing countries could do nothing to change 
these conditions at the source, just as one cannot do anything about 
bad weather. But their policies had to adjust to these conditions, just 
as one can buy an umbrella against the rain. (By contrast, as I note 
below, the second export pessimism of the 1980s is rooted in protec- 
tionist threats, which can be addressed at the source and hence have 
critically different implications for developing country policies.) 
The export pessimism following World War II was to prove unjusti- 
fied by the unfolding reality. World trade did not merely grow rapidly 
during the 1950s and 1960s, it grew even faster than world income. 
The growth rates in both output and trade were unprecedented for 
such sustained periods (see table 1). Furthermore, the economies that 
shifted quickly to an EP strategy experienced substantial improvements 
in their export performance. This was particularly the case for four 
Far Eastern economies-Hong Kong, Singapore, the Republic of Ko- 
rea, and Taiwan-but it was by no means confined to them. The 
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Table 1. Postwar Growth Rates of World Output 
and Trade 
(average annual percentage change) 
Period World output World trade 
1953-63 4.3 6.1 
1963-73 5.1 8.9 
1973-83 2.5 2.8 
Source: Hufbauer and Schott 1985, table A-1, p. 97. 
dramatic rise in these economies' share of trade in GDP over this 
period placed them well above the regression lines for trade-GDP ratios 
and per capita incomes. These regressions would suggest that trade- 
GDP ratios fall as per capita income rises, whereas these successful 
exporters showed a spectacular rise in their trade shares as their per 
capita incomes grew rapidly.' Clearly, history has sided with econo- 
mists such as Cairncross (1962) and Krueger (1961) who had been 
among the foremost critics of export pessimism. 
Although the evidence of successful trade expansion decisively re- 
futed the validity of export pessimism, the economic analysis in sup- 
port of such pessimism was also to prove enlightening and has a 
bearing on the dissection of the resurgent, second export pessimism 
prevalent today. Nurkse, for instance, had embraced Robertson's clas- 
sic phrase: trade as "an engine of growth," which established a rather 
strong and direct link in the export pessimists' minds between exter- 
nal conditions and internal expansion. In a classic throwback to this 
form of argumentation, Lewis (1980) argued more recently in a much- 
quoted passage:6 
The growth rate of world trade in primary products over the period 
of 1873 to 1913 was 0.87 times the growth rate of industrial 
production in the developed countries; and just about the same 
relationship, about 0.87, also ruled in the two decades to 1973... 
We need no elaborate statistical proof that trade depends on 
prosperity in the industrial countries (p. 556). 
But, it is evident from several analyses,7 the latest being by Riedel 
(1984), that such stable relationships (which suggest the exclusive 
dominance of demand in determining trade performance) simply can- 
not be extracted from the export experience of developing countries 
in the postwar period. The export performance of these and other 
countries must be explained by domestic incentives (or supply) more 
than by external (or demand) conditions. It is worth restating the two 
main arguments supporting this conclusion. 
First, although Lewis addresses the linkage between industrial coun- 
try incomes and developing country exports of primary products, 
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Riedel (1984, table 4) shows that even this aggregate developing coun- 
try relationship is not stable. The stability, in turn, obviously cannot 
be maintained for individual developing countries. 
Second, it is important to note again that the postwar period has 
seen a dramatic shift in the export composition of developing coun- 
tries toward manufactures. Developing country exports of manufac- 
tures grew threefold in the 1955-78 period and represented one-fourth 
of overall exports. Manufactures are now close in magnitude to the 
other nonfuel exports such as food, minerals, and agricultural raw 
materials. Of course, the successful exporters of the postwar period 
dominate this shift. But their experience, based on domestic policies, 
proves that one cannot assess trade potential through mechanical 
linkages to industrial country income expansion. 
The most compelling aggregate statistics show that during the pros- 
perous 1960s, developing countries' exports of manufactures grew 
nearly twice as fast as the industrial countries' incomes. The expan- 
sion of developing countries' trade over the 1950s and 1960s occurred 
as protection in the industrial countries was diminishing sharply as a 
consequence of first the elimination of quotas and then the reduction 
in tariffs. Even during the troubled 1970s, developing countries' ex- 
ports of manufactures grew more than four times as rapidly as the 
industrial countries' income.8 
The only key question that has remained at issue, therefore, is what 
has been called the "fallacy of composition": can all, or most, devel- 
oping countries become successful exporters simultaneously? Or, fo- 
cusing on the successful Asian exporters, the question may be put: can 
the Asian export model be successfully exported to all? The suspicion 
still lingers that the success of a few was built on the failure of the 
many and that, if all had shifted to the EP strategy, none would have 
fared well. 
There are two distinct sources of this worry. The first presumes that 
markets would not be able to absorb all of the exports that would 
materialize if developing countries shifted to an EP strategy. The sec- 
ond argues that while the markets could be found, they would be 
closed by protectionist measures, provoked by the import penetration 
and outcries of market disruption. The second source is the major 
cause of export pessimism today, while the first source was the one 
that afflicted the earlier wave of export pessimism. I now examine the 
former argument and defer discussion of the latter. 
First, as I shall argue more fully below, the fear that world trade 
would have to grow by leaps and bounds if most developing countries 
pursued an EP strategy is unwarranted. This fear follows from trying 
to put all countries on the curve estimated in Cline (1982) for the 
Asian exporters with very high ratios of trade to national income. 
The pursuit of an EP strategy simply amounts to the adoption of a 
30 Research Observer 3, no. 1 (January 1988) 
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structure of incentives which does not discriminate against exports in 
favor of the home market. This does not imply that the resulting 
increases in trade-income ratios will be necessarily as dramatic as in 
the Far Eastern case. 
Second, the share of developing countries in the markets for manu- 
factures in most industrial countries has been, and continues to be, 
relatively small. In the aggregate, the share of manufactured exports 
from developing countries in the consumption of manufactures in the 
industrial countries runs at a little over 2 percent. "Absorptive capaci- 
ty" purely in the market sense, therefore, is not prima facie a plausi- 
ble source of worry. 
Third, a chief lesson of the postwar experience is that policymakers 
who seek to forecast exports typically understate export potential by 
understating the absorptive capacity of import markets. This comes 
largely from having to focus on known exports and partly from 
downward estimation biases when price elasticities for such exports 
are econometrically measured. Experience underlines the enormous 
capacity of wholly unforeseen markets to develop when incentives 
exist to make profits; "miscellaneous exports" often represent the 
source of spectacular gains when the bias against exports, typical of is 
regimes, is removed. 
Fourth, trade economists have increasingly appreciated the potential 
for intraindustry specialization as trade opportunities open. The pro- 
gressive dismantling of trade barriers within the European Communi- 
ties (EC), for instance, led to increased mutual trade in similar prod- 
ucts rather than to massive reductions in the scale of output in indus- 
try groups within industrial member states.9 There is no reason to 
doubt that such intraindustry trade in manufactures among develop- 
ing countries and between them and the industrial countries can also 
develop significantly. 
Finally, if we reckon with the potential for trade between develop- 
ing countries where policies can change to permit its increase, and the 
possibility of opening new sectors such as agriculture and services to 
freer trade, then the export possibilities are even more abundant than 
the preceding arguments indicate.10 
Therefore, although the postwar export pessimism was unjustified, 
it provided a rationale for the adoption of inward-looking trade poli- 
cies in many developing countries. In addition, trade restrictions were 
adopted to protect the industries that had grown up fortuitously in 
Latin America because World War II had provided artificial induce- 
ment to set up domestic capacities to produce interrupted supplies 
from traditional, competitive suppliers abroad.1" Often, chiefly in 
Latin America, there was also a reluctance to devalue. Combined with 
high rates of inflation, this caused continuously overvalued exchange 
rates that amounted to a de facto is trade policy (see the appendix).12 
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What exactly is meant by an export-promoting trade strategy? Clar- 
ification of the question is important, especially as the everyday usage 
of this phrase evokes many unrelated notions. 
The definitions of EP and is that are most widely accepted, and are 
used by economists who have long studied these matters, relate to 
incentives. The is strategy is defined as the adoption of an effective 
exchange rate for the country's exports (EERX) which is less than that 
for imports (EERm). EERX would include, for a peso currency country, 
not just the pesos earned at parity from a unit dollar's worth of 
export, but also any export subsidy, tax credits, and special credits. (It 
would also include, say, for tractor export the subsidy on the input of 
steel that is used in the exported tractor, so that there is no distinction 
between EER comparisons defined on value added or gross value, for 
the purpose at hand.) Similarly EERm would add to the parity any 
import duty, import premiums resulting from quantitative restrictions 
(QRS), and other charges. If a dollar's worth of exports fetches alto- 
gether 100 pesos, whereas a dollar's worth of imports fetches 130 
pesos, the incentive structure implies EERX<EERm. This constitutes a 
"bias against exports," a concept that seems to have come indepen- 
dently into use in Bhagwati (1968), Little, Scitovsky, and Scott (1970), 
and Balassa (1971). This is also the hallmark of the is strategy: it 
creates a net incentive to import-substitute relative to what interna- 
tional prices dictate. 
Suppose, however, that EERm yields 100 pesos per dollar's worth of 
imports, while EERX is also 100 pesos. Then, the home market sales 
will give a producer as much as exporting will: the incentive structure 
then implies EER 
x=EERm. Thus bias against exports will have been 
eliminated. This is defined as the EP strategy. 
These definitions of EP and is strategies are now in common usage. 
But they do raise a question: how do we christen the case where there 
is a significant excess of EERX over EERm? Where the effective exchange 
rate is more favorable for exports than for imports, should we not 
call that EP instead of the one where EERX - EERm as the above defini- 
tions do, and instead call the case with EERX -LEERm simply the trade- 
neutral or bias-free strategy? Perhaps that might have been the ideal 
way to do it. But the EP strategy came to be defined in the academic 
literature as the one with bias-free incentives simply because the em- 
pirical studies of the four Far Eastern economies, particularly in the 
NBER project, strongly suggested that these successful outward-orient- 
ed developers were closer to neutrality than to a substantial positive 
bias in favor of exports.'3 Furthermore, countries that went from an is 
strategy to a neutral strategy, which eliminated the bias against ex- 
ports and improved their export performance, prompted researchers 
to define EP strategy in terms of neutrality. Given the now common 
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usage of these terms, therefore, I have suggested recently the following 
terminology that does least violence to what has been the practice to 
date: " 
IS strategy: EERX < EERm 
EP strategy: EER IEERm 
Ultra-EP strategy: EERX > EERm 
Nonetheless, it is not uncommon, especially among policymakers, to 
find references to EP (or outward-oriented) trade strategy as including 
both the neutral and the pro-export bias strategies."5 The reader must 
be alert to see what exactly is the implicit definition being used in a 
particular context. 
These definitions clearly relate to average incentives. Nonetheless, it 
is obvious that, within EP for instance, some activities may be import- 
substituting in the sense that their EERM exceeds the average EERX. 
Thus, the pursuit of either the EP or the ultra-EP strategy does not 
preclude import-substituting in selected sectors. This is true for most 
of the successful Far Eastern developers. Nor does this fact render 
meaningless the distinction among the different trade strategies, as is 
sometimes contended. As I have argued elsewhere (Bhagwati 1986c): 
We also need to remember always that the average EERX and EERm 
can and do conceal very substantial variations among different 
exports and among different imports. In view of this fact, I have 
long emphasized the need to distinguish between the questions of 
the degree of import substitution and the pattern of import substi- 
tution. Thus, within the broad aggregates of an EP country case, 
there may well be activities that are being import-substituted (i.e., 
their EERm exceeds the average EERx ). Indeed there often are. But 
one should not jump to the erroneous conclusion that there is 
therefore no way to think of EP versus Is and that the distinction is 
an artificial one- any more than one would refuse to acknowledge 
that the Sahara is a desert, whereas Sri Lanka is not, simply because 
there are some oases (p. 93). 
Nor should one equate the EP strategy with the absence of govern- 
ment intervention, as is often done by proponents of the Is strategy 
and sometimes by advocates of the EP strategy as well. It is true that a 
laissez-faire policy would satisfy the requirement that EERX = EERm. 
This is not a necessary condition for this outcome, however. The Far 
Eastern economies (with the exception of Hong Kong) and others that 
have come close to the EP strategy have been characterized by con- 
siderable government activity in the economic system. In my judg- 
ment, such intervention can be of great value, and almost certainly 
has been so, in making the EP strategy work successfully. By publicly 
supporting the outward-oriented strategy, by even bending in some 
cases toward ultra-export promotion, and by gearing the credit insti- 
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tutions to supporting export activities in an overt fashion, govern- 
ments in these countries appear to have established the necessary 
confidence that their commitment to the EP strategy is serious, thus 
inducing firms to undertake costly investments and programs to take 
advantage of the EP strategy. 
The laissez-faire model does not quite capture this aspect of the 
problem since governments, except in the models of Friedman and 
Bakunin, fail to abstain or self-destruct; they will invariably find 
something, indeed much, to do. Therefore, explicit commitment o an 
activist, supportive role in pursuit of the EP strategy, providing the 
assurance that it will be protected from inroads in pursuit of numer- 
ous other objectives in the near future, would appear to constitute a 
definite advantage in reaping the benefits of this strategy. 
Some other caveats are also in order. 
Development economists such as Chenery and his many associates 
have used the terminology of is and EP in a wholly different fashion. 
They have typically used identities to decompose observed growth of 
output in an industry or the economy into components attributable to 
export promotion, import substitution, and other categories.16 Quite 
aside from the fact that such decompositions are, except under singu- 
lar circumstances, statistical descriptions without analytical signific- 
ance, they also have no relationship to the incentives-related defini- 
tions of trade strategy that have been set out here. Unfortunately, this 
distinction occasionally gets confused in popular discussions, especial- 
ly as economists sometimes deploy both usages simultaneously (that 
is, using the incentives-based definition to group countries into alter- 
native categories and the Chenery-type terminology to explain their 
economic performance, as in Balassa 1983). 
The incentives-defined EP strategy also has to be distinguished from 
the traditional concept of "export-led" growth, in which a country's 
exports generate income expansion attributable to direct gains from 
trade and indirect beneficial effects. The notion of export-led growth 
is closer to Nurkse's and Lewis's export pessimism that was dissected 
earlier. The incentives-related EP definition has literally nothing to do 
with such beneficial external phenomena. Whether the success of an 
EP strategy, defined in terms of freedom from bias against exports, 
requires the presence of a beneficial external environment is a separate 
issue that will be treated again in a later section that focuses on the 
revived export pessimism. 
Finally, it is worth stressing that the concept of EP or outward 
orientation relates to trade incentives (direct trade policies or domes- 
tic or exchange rate policies that affect trade) but does not imply that 
the EP strategy countries must be equally outward-oriented in regard 
to their policies concerning foreign investment. Hong Kong and Singa- 
pore have been more favorable in their treatment of foreign investors 
34 Research Observer 3, no. 1 (January 1988) 
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than the great majority of the is countries, but the historic growth of 
Japan, presumably as an EP country, was characterized by extremely 
selective control on the entry of foreign investment. Logically and 
empirically, the two types of outward orientation, in trade and in 
foreign investment, are distinct phenomena, though whether one can 
exist efficiently without the other is an important question that has 
been raised in the literature and is surrounded by far more controver- 






With the EP strategy defined in terms of the incentive structure, the 
substantive conclusion that has emerged from the major research 
projects listed earlier is that the economic performance of the EP 
countries has been remarkably strong, although they had no one 
rooting for their success when development efforts were being initiat- 
ed in the early 1950s. Here, as elsewhere, history has turned up 
surprises. 
In evaluating this outcome, we have to distinguish between two 
questions: (a) why should the EP strategy have been helpful in acceler- 
ating economic development, and (b) could the acceleration have been 
caused by factors other than the EP strategy? 
The Evidence 
The serious evidence on the successful impact of the EP strategy on 
economic performance, as measured by an improved growth rate, has 
to be found in the country studies of the research projects on trade 
and development (listed earlier). Among these, the most compelling 
evidence is in the analyses in the NBER project where the EP strategy 
was carefully defined and transitions to it from an is strategy by 
various phases were systematically investigated."' 
There is also much cited evidence that relates largely to associations 
between growth rates of exports and growth rates of income, as in the 
work of Michaely (1977) who used data for 1950-73 for forty-one 
countries, and the further extension of this type of work by Balassa 
(1978) and Feder (1983).'" Complementing this approach is the al- 
together different statistical formulation in Michalopoulos and Jay 
(1973). This study takes a very different approach to the problem by 
using exports as an argument in estimating an economywide produc- 
tion function from aggregate output and factor use data. Using data 
for thirty-nine countries this study argued that exports are an inde- 
pendent input into national income.'9 
Neither the Michaely-Balassa-Feder nor the Michalopoulos-Jay 
findings, however, bear directly on the question whether the EP strate- 
gy is productive of more growth, because the incentive-related EP 
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strategy is not the one used to examine the question of income or 
growth performance. It is necessary to identify whether the superior 
export growth rates (or higher export magnitudes) belong to the EP 
countries. 
This is particularly worrisome since high growth rates of exports 
may have been caused by high growth rates of output (which, in turn, 
may have resulted from other exogenous factors such as a higher 
savings effort), rather than the other way around. Thus, if Is does not 
parametrically reduce trade greatly, it is conceivable that this reverse 
causation could lead the rapidly expanding countries, whether EP or 
IS, to show higher export growth rates than less rapidly expanding 
economies. 
Hence, while these cross-country regressions are certainly interest- 
ing, valuable and suggestive, they cannot be considered compelling on 
the issue in question, especially as they (and conclusions based on 
them) are likely to be critically dependent on the period, sample of 
countries, and variables chosen. By contrast, the detailed country 
studies are methodologically superior and more persuasive. And, as 
noted already, they do indicate the superiority of the EP strategy. 
The Reasons 
Economists have been preoccupied with the reasons why the is 
strategy has been generally dominated by the EP strategy, and why the 
countries that rapidly made the transition from the former to the 
latter have done better. The following hypotheses have been ad- 
vanced, based on the usual mix of analytical insights, casual empiri- 
cism, and econometric evidence.20 
Resource Allocation Efficiency. The first set of reasons for the 
success of the EP strategy relies on the fact that it brings incentives for 
domestic resource allocation closer to international opportunity costs 
and hence closer to what will generally produce efficient outcomes. 
This is true, not merely in the sense that there is no bias against 
exports and in favor of the home market (that is, EERx l EERm) under 
the EP strategy, but also in the sense that the is countries seem to have 
generally had a chaotic dispersion of EERS among the different activi- 
ties within export and import-competing activities as well. That is, 
the degree of is goes far and the pattern of is reflects widely divergent 
incentives. By contrast, the EP strategy does better both on degree 
(since EERX; ,EERm) and on pattern. 
Why is the degree of bias so large and the pattern wrong under Is? 
The answer seems to lie in the way in which Is is often practiced and 
in the constraints that surround EP. Thus is could, in principle, be 
contained to modest excess of EERm over EER . But typically Is arises 
in the context of overvalued exchange rates and associated exchange 
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controls. So there is no way in which the excess of domestic over 
foreign prices is being tracked by government agencies in most cases, 
and the excesses of EERM over EERX simply go unnoticed. The non- 
transparency is fatal. By contrast, EP typically tends to constrain itself 
to rough equality, and ultra-EP also seems to be moderate in practice, 
because policy-induced excesses of EERX over EERm often require subsi- 
dization that is constrained by budgetary problems. 
In the same way, the pattern of EERm can be terribly chaotic be- 
cause exchange controls and QRs on trade will typically generate 
differential premiums and hence differential degrees of implied protec- 
tion of thousands of import-competing activities. By contrast, the EP 
strategy will typically unify exchange rates, which avoids these prob- 
lems and, when it relies on export subsidization, will be handled 
both with necessary transparency and with budgetary constraints that 
would then prevent wide dispersions in EERS. 
The chaotic nature of differential incentives among diverse activities 
in is regimes has been documented by estimates of effective rates of 
protection (ERPS) (though these estimates can be misleading in quanti- 
tative restrictions regimes where the import premiums may reflect 
effects of investment controls, indicating therefore resource denial 
rather than resource attraction to the high-premium and therefore, 
other things being equal, the high-ERP activities. The estimates of 
cross-sectional domestic resource costs (DRCs), which provide instead 
a guide to differential social returns to different activities, have also 
underlined these lessons. The conceptual and measurement analyses 
of several distinguished economists, including Michael Bruno, Max 
Corden, Harry Johnson, and Anne Krueger, have contributed greatly 
to this literature. 
Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking and Rent-Seeking Activities. 
Yet another important aspect of the difference between EP and Is 
strategies is that is regimes are more likely to trigger what economic 
theorists now call directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities 
(Bhagwati 1982b). These activities divert resources from productive 
use into unproductive but profitable lobbying to change policies or to 
evade them or to seek the revenue and rents they generate." Rent- 
seeking activities (Krueger 1974), where lobbies chase rents attached 
to import licenses and other quantitative restrictions, are an important 
subset of such DUP activities. The diversion of entrepreneurial energies 
and real resources into such DUP activities tends to add to the conven- 
tionally measured losses from the high degree and chaotic pattern of 
Is.22 
It must be admitted that, although economists have now begun to 
make attempts at estimating these costs, they are nowhere near arriv- 
ing at plausible estimates simply because it is not yet possible to 
estimate realistically the production functions for returns to different 
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kinds of lobbying. But, as Harrod once remarked, arguments that 
cannot be quantified are not necessarily unimportant in economics, 
and the losses arising from DUP and rent-seeking activities seem pre- 
sently to illustrate his observation.23 
Foreign Investment. If is regimes have tended to use domestic re- 
sources inefficiently in the ways that were just outlined, the same 
applies to the use of foreign resources. This is perhaps self-evident, 
but substantial theoretical work by Bhagwati (1973), Brecher and 
Diaz-Alejandro (1977), Uzawa (1969), Hamada (1974), and others has 
established that foreign investment that comes in over QRs and tar- 
iffs-the so-called tariff-jumping investment-is capable of immiseriz- 
ing the recipient country under conditions that seem uncannily close 
to the conditions in the is countries in the postwar decades. These 
conditions require capital flows into capital-intensive sectors in the 
protected activities. It is thus plausible that, if these inflows were not 
actually harmful, the social returns on them were at least low com- 
pared with what they would be in the EP countries where the inflows 
were not tariff-jumping but rather aimed at world markets, in line 
with the EP strategy of the recipient countries. 
In addition, I have hypothesized (Bhagwati 1978 and 1986a) that, 
other things being equal, foreign investments into is countries will be 
self-limiting in the long run because they are aimed at the home 
market and therefore constrained by it. If so, and there seems to be 
some preliminary evidence in support of this hypothesis in ongo- 
ing econometric analysis,24 then Is countries would have been han- 
dicapped also by the lower amount of foreign investment flows and 
not just by their lower social productivity compared with the EP 
countries. 
Gray Area Dynamic Effects. Although the arguments so far provide 
ample satisfaction to those who seek to understand why the EP strate- 
gy does so well, dissatisfaction has continued to be expressed that 
these are arguments of static efficiency and that dynamic factors such 
as savings and innovations may well be favorable under an import- 
substituting trade strategy. 
Of course, if what we are seeking to explain is the relative success 
of the EP countries with growth, this counterargumentation makes 
little sense since, even if it were true, the favorable effects from 
these "gray area" sources of dynamic efficiency would have been 
outweighed in practice by the static efficiency aspects. But the coun- 
terargumentation is not compelling anyway. Overall, it is not possible 
to claim that is regimes enable a country to save more or less than EP 
regimes: the evidence in the NBER project, for instance, went both 
ways. Nor does it seem possible to maintain that EP or IS regimes are 
necessarily more innovative. It is possible to argue that EP regimes 
may lead to more competition and less-sheltered markets and hence 
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more innovation. But equally, Schumpeterian arguments suggest that 
the opposite might also be true.25 
The few recent studies that have appeared do suggest that the 
EP strategy may encourage greater innovation. Krueger and Tuncer 
(1980) examined eighteen Turkish manufacturing industries during the 
1963-76 period. They found that periods of low productivity growth 
roughly occurred during periods when foreign exchange controls were 
particularly restrictive and hence the is strategy was being accentuat- 
ed. The overall rate of productivity growth was also low throughout 
the period during which Turkey pursued an is strategy. In an analy- 
sis of productivity change in Japan, Korea, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, 
Nishimizu and Robinson (1984) argue that if growth is decomposed 
into that due to "domestic demand expansion," "export expansion," 
and "import substitution," the interindustrial variation in factor pro- 
ductivity growth reflects (except for Japan) the relative roles of export 
expansion and import substitution, the former causing a positive im- 
pact and the latter a negative one. However, as the authors recognize, 
export expansion may have been caused by productivity change rath- 
er than the other way around, the regressions begging the issue of 
causality. 
What is the influence of economies of scale in EP and Is regimes? 
Theoretically, the EP success should be increased because world mar- 
kets are certainly larger than home markets. But, systematic evidence 
is not yet available on this question. For instance, evidence is lacking 
to indicate whether firms that turn to export markets are character- 
ized by greater scale of output than those firms that do not. Experi- 
ence in the case of the EC suggests that trade may lead not to changes 
in the level of output so much as to product specialization. 
Suppose however that we do assume that economies of scale will be 
exploited when trade expands. The cost of protection, or the gains 
from trade, will then rise significantly. Harris (1986) has calculated for 
Canada that a 3.6 percent rise in GNP could follow from the unilateral 
elimination of Canadian tariffs, if the economies of scale are fully 
exploited. 
Finally, in the matter of X-efficiency, it is again plausible that firms 
under is regimes should find themselves more frequently in sheltered 
and monopolistic environments than those under EP regimes; a great 
deal of such evidence is available from the country studies in the 
several research projects discussed. X-efficiency therefore ought to be 
greater under the EP regime. However, as is well known, this is a 
notoriously gray area where measurement has often turned out to be 
elusive. 
Although the arguments for the success of the EP strategy based on 
economies of scale and X-efficiency are plausible, empirical support 
for them is not available. The arguments on savings and innovation 
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provide a less than compelling case for showing that EP is necessarily 
better on their account than is. 
Growth and Other Objectives 
A final word is necessary on the superior economic performance of 
the EP strategy. Much like the die-hard monetarists who keep shifting 
their definitions of money as necessary in order to keep their faith, the 
proponents of is have tended to shift their objections as required by 
the state of the art. 
When it became evident that the EP strategy yielded higher growth 
and that the static versus dynamic efficiency arguments were not 
persuasive and probably went in favor of the EP strategy, the is 
proponents shifted ground. They took to arguing that the objective of 
development was not growth but the alleviation of poverty or unem- 
ployment and that EP might be better for growth but was worse for 
these other objectives. This was part of a larger argument that be- 
came fashionable during the 1970s in certain development circles: that 
growth had been the objective of development o date; that the objec- 
tive was wrong; that the true objective of poverty amelioration was ill 
served by development efforts directed at growth; and that growth 
even harmed (in certain formulations of such critics) the poor. 
The evidence does not support the views that growth was desired in 
itself, that poverty elimination was not a stated objective which was 
pursued by the acceleration of growth rates to "pullk up" the poor into 
gainful employment, and that growth on a sustained basis has not 
helped the poor. These orthodoxies are no longer regarded as plausi- 
ble, as I have argued at length elsewhere.26 
In regard to the narrower question at hand, that is, whether the EP 
strategy procures efficiency and growth but adversely affects poverty 
and employment, evidence has now been gathered extensively in a 
sequel NBER project, directed by Krueger (1982). Essentially, she and 
her associates document how investment allocation under EP requires 
the expansion of labor-intensive activities, because developing country 
exports are typically labor-intensive. Therefore, EP strategies tend to 
encourage the use of labor and hence the growth of employment and 
the alleviation of poverty in countries that typically have underem- 
ployed labor. 
Moreover, after more than two decades of successful growth in the 
EP regimes, especially in the four Far Eastern economies, it has be- 
come easier for economists to contemplate and comprehend the effects 
of compound rates and the advantages of being on rapid escalators. 
Even if it had been true that the EP strategy yielded currently lower 
employment or lower real wages, the rapid growth rates would over- 
whelm these disadvantages in the time of simply one generation. It 
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would appear therefore that both the employment-intensive nature of 
EP growth in developing countries and the higher growth rates in the 
EP countries have provided a substantial antidote to the poverty and 





These lessons were important. Many developing countries learned 
them the hard way: by following is policies too long and seeing the 
fortunate few pursuing the EP strategy do much better. Perhaps learn- 
ing by others' doing and one's own undoing is the most common 
form of education! 
But just as these lessons were widely accepted, and a "new ortho- 
doxy" in their favor was established, a new wave of export pessimism 
arrived on the scene. This second export pessimism, which is paradoxi- 
cally both more serious and more tractable in principle, tends to under- 
mine the desired shift to the EP strategy in the developing countries. 
There are two sets of factors generating this pessimism: (a) objec- 
tive events such as the slowing down of the world economy since the 
1970s and the resurgence of powerful protectionist sentiments in the 
industrial countries, and (b) new intellectual and academic arguments 
in support of inward-looking trade policies in the developing coun- 
tries. The two are not entirely unrelated since theory, especially inter- 
national trade theory, does not grow in a vacuum. But they can be 
dealt with sequentially nonetheless. 
In essence, the second export pessimism rests on the view that, 
whatever the market-defined absorptive capacity for the exports of the 
developing countries, the politics of protectionism in the industrial 
countries (which still constitute the chief markets of developing coun- 
try exports) is such that the exports from developing countries face 
serious and crippling constraints that make the pursuit of an EP strate- 
gy (with EERX E ERm) inefficient, if not positively foolish. 
If this assessment is correct, then the EP strategy's premise that 
foreign markets are available at prices largely independent of one's 
own exports is certainly not valid. But this must be correctly under- 
stood. If Brazil successfully exports footwear, for example, and the 
importing countries invoke market-disruption-related QRS, or frivolous 
countervailing duty (CVD) retaliation, then Brazil faces a less than 
perfectly elastic market for footwear, and an optimal tariff (that is, a 
shift to is strategy) in this sector is called for. This should justify only 
selective protection, carefully devised and administered, not a general 
Is strategy. If, however, this response is feared no matter what is 
exported, that is, the fear of protectionism is nearly universal in 
scope, a generalized shift to is strategy unfortunately would be appro- 
priate. 
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The second pessimism, like the first, takes the latter, vastly more 
fearsome form, extending to exports generally. The resulting case for 
a general shift to the is strategy then collapses only if the protectionist 
threat can be shown to be less serious than it appears or if the threat, 
even though serious, can be contained by multilateral efforts or other 
policy options that ought to be undertaken along with the EP strategy. 
As it happens, a case can be made in support of both these responses. 
How Serious Is 
the Protectionist 
Threat? 
In assessing the extent to which the protectionist threat must be 
taken seriously, one may first make the prudential statement that it 
should never be regarded lightly. Sectional interests have always pro- 
vided the political momentum through congresses and parliaments to 
protectionist responses to import competition. The postwar history of 
trade barriers also shows, however, the important role that execu- 
tive branches have played in upholding the national interest, broad- 
ly served by freer trade and specialization. The real question is: has 
the threat become sufficiently more serious so that the developing 
countries ought to turn away from embracing the EP strategy? 
First, a few facts need to be noted. As table 1 briefly indicates, 
trade expansion has certainly slowed considerably since the 1970s. But 
even so, world trade has grown faster than world income during the 
1970-83 period. More compelling is the fact that the developing coun- 
tries' exports of manufactures to the industrial countries have grown 
almost twice as fast as the exports of these countries to one another, 
showing even during the 1970s a growth rate of more than 8 percent 
annually. This has happened during a period when nontariff barriers 
(NTBS), such as voluntary export restraints (VERS), began to proliferate 
and when the OECD countries showed sluggish growth rates and in- 
creased unemployment. 
That exports from the developing countries continued to grow in 
this fashion was first highlighted by Hughes and Krueger (1984) who 
thought that it was a puzzle since a large amount of actual protection 
seemed to have already been adopted. This puzzle has stimulated 
Baldwin (1982 and 1985) into developing an interesting thesis: that 
protection is far less effective than one thinks simply because there are 
many ways in which exporting countries can get around it in continu- 
ing to increase their export earnings. Thus, Baldwin has written: 
Consider the response of exporting firms to the imposition of tighter 
foreign restrictions on imports of a particular product. One immediate 
response will be to try to ship the product in a form which is not 
covered by the restriction... One case involves coats with removable 
sleeves. By importing sleeves unattached, the rest of the coat comes in 
as a vest, thereby qualifying for more favorable tariff treatment... 
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The use of substitute components is another common way of 
getting around import restrictions. The quotas on imports of sugar 
into the United States only apply to pure sugar, defined as 100 
percent sucrose. Foreign exporters are avoiding the quotas by 
shipping sugar products consisting mainly of sucrose, but also 
containing a sugar substitute, for example, dextrose... At one time, 
exporters of running shoes to the United States avoided the high 
tariff on rubber footwear by using leather for most of the upper 
portion of the shoes, thereby qualifying for duty treatment as 
leather shoes" (1985, p. 110). 
Yoffie (1983) has also recently examined the VERS on footwear and 
textiles from a political scientist's perspective and found that the 
dynamic exporting economies such as Korea and Taiwan have em- 
braced them with considerable ingenuity, much like what Baldwin has 
documented, to continue expanding their exports significantly. 
There is also a more subtle factor at play here which relates to 
why VERS may have provided the mechanism by which the executive 
branches of government interested in maintaining freer trade may 
have succeeded in keeping trade expanding. VERs are, in that view, a 
"porous" form of protection that is deliberately preferred because 
of this nontransparent porousness. I have argued recently (Bhagwati 
1986b) that in industries such as footwear, two characteristics seem to 
hold that lend support to this porous protection model as an explana- 
tion for why protection is ineffective: (a) undifferentiated products 
(that is, cheaper varieties of garments and footwear) make it easy to 
"transship," that is, to cheat on rules of origin, passing off products of 
a country restricted by VERs as products of countries not covered by 
VERS; and (b) low start-up costs and therefore small recoupment hori- 
zons apply in shifting investment and hence products to adjacent third 
countries that are not covered by VERS, so that an exporting country 
can get around (admittedly at some cost) the VERs by "investment- 
shunting" to sources unafflicted by VERS. This strategy allows the 
exporter to recover his investment costs, since it is usually some time 
before the VERS get around to covering these alternative sources, or 
VERs are eliminated as the political pressure subsides (as was the case 
with U.S. footwear).7 
In both ways, therefore, VERS in these types of industries can yield a 
"close-to-free-trade" solution for the exporting countries. These coun- 
tries can continue to profit from their comparative advantage by 
effectively exploiting, legally (through investment-shunting) and ille- 
gally (through transshipments), the fact that VERS leave third countries 
out whereas importing country tariffs and quotas do not.28 
But the question then arises: why would the protecting importing 
countries prefer this porous protection? Does it not imply that the 
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market-disrupted industry fails to be protected as it would under a 
corresponding import trade restraint? Indeed it does. But that is pre- 
cisely its attractiveness. 
If executive branches want free trade in the national interest 
whereas legislatures respond to the sectoral interests-definitely the 
stylized description of the "two-headed" democracies in the United 
States and the United Kingdom-then it can be argued that executives 
will prefer to use a porous form of protection which, while ensuring 
freer market access, will nonetheless manage to appear as a conces- 
sion to the political demands for protection from the legislature or 
from their constituencies. Undoubtedly, these protectionist groups and 
their congressional spokesmen will eventually complain about con- 
tinuing imports. But then the executive branch can always cite itS VER 
actions, promise to look into complaints and perhaps bring other 
countries into the VER net, and continue to obfuscate and buy time 
without effectively protecting.79 
If the foregoing arguments suggest that executives have been clever 
enough, both in exporting and importing countries, in keeping markets 
much more open than the casual reading of the newspapers would 
suggest, there are also additional forces in favor of freer trade that have 
now emerged in the world economy which need to be considered in 
making a reasonable assessment of the prospects for increased protec- 
tionist measures. I believe that the international political economy has 
changed dramatically in the last two decades to generate new and 
influential actors that are supportive of freer world trade. 
A fairly common complaint on the part of analysts of the political 
economy has been the asymmetry of pressure groups in the tariff- 
making process. The beneficiaries of protection are often concentrat- 
ed, whereas its victims tend to be either diffused (as is the case with 
final consumers) or unable to recognize the losses they incur (as when 
protection indirectly affects exports and hence hurts those engaged in 
producing exportables) .30 
Direct foreign investment (DFI) and the growing maze of globalized 
production have changed this equation perceptibly. When DFI iS un- 
dertaken, not for tariff-jumping in locally sheltered markets, but for 
exports to the home country or to third markets, as is increasingly the 
case, protectionism threatens the investments so made and tends to 
galvanize these influential multinationals into lobbying to keep mar- 
kets open. For example, it was noticeable that when the U.S. semicon- 
ductor suppliers recently gathered to discuss antidumping legal action 
against Japanese producers of memory microchips known as EPROMs 
(or erasable programmable read-only memories), noticeably absent 
were Motorola Inc. and Texas Instruments Inc. who produce semicon- 
ductors in Japan and expect to be shipping some back to the United 
States.31 
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Almost certainly a main reason why U.S. protectionism has not 
translated into a disastrous Smoot-Hawley scenario, despite high 
unemployment levels and the seriously overvalued dollar (in the 
Dutch Disease sense), is that far fewer congressmen today have consti- 
tuencies where DFI has not created such protrade, antiprotectionist 
presence, muddying waters where protectionists would have otherwise 
sailed with great ease. The "spiderweb" phenomenon resulting from 
DFI that criss-crosses the world economy has thus been a stablilizing 
force in favor of holding the protectionists at bay. 
It is not just the DFI in place that provides these trade-reinforcing 
political pressures.32 The reaction against import competition has 
been diluted by the possibility of using international factor mobility as 
a policy response. Thus, the possibility of undertaking DFI when faced 
with import competition also provides an alternative to a protectionist 
response. Since this is the capitalist response, rather than a response 
of labor to "losing jobs abroad," the defusion of the protectionist 
threat that is implied here works by breaking the customary alliance 
between capital and labor within an industry in their protectionist 
lobbying, a relationship with which Magee has made us long familiar. 
Labor today seems also to have caught on to this game and is not 
averse to using threats of protection to induce DFI from foreign com- 
petitors instead. The United Auto Workers labor union in the United 
States appears to have helped to induce Japanese investments in the 
car industry. This is quite a generic phenomenon where DFI is under- 
taken by the Japanese exporting firms to buy off the local pressure 
groups of firms or unions that threaten legislative pressures for tariffs 
to close the import markets. This type of induced DFI has been chris- 
tened "quid pro quo DFI" (Bhagwati 1985c) and appears to be a 
growing phenomenon (certainly on the part of Japanese firms), repre- 
senting a new and alternative form of response to import competition 
than provided by old-fashioned tariff-making.33 
In short, both actual DFI (through the spiderweb effect) and poten- 
tial DFI (outward by domestic capital and quid pro quo inward by 
foreign capital) are powerful forces that are influencing the political 
economy of tariff-making in favor of an open economy. They surely 
provide some counterweight to the gloom that the protectionist noises 
generate today. 
But all these arguments could collapse under the weight of the 
contention that if many countries were indeed to shift to the EP 
strategy, whether through conversion to the view or through condi- 
tionality such as that envisaged under the plan put forth by U.S. 
Treasury Secretary James Baker III in 1985, the pressures to close 
markets would multiply owing to the magnitude of the absorption of 
exports that this would imply for the industrial countries. 
This takes us back partly to the Cline (1982) estimates and the 
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several refutations of the pessimism engendered by them that were set 
out earlier.34 But it remains true that, even if the estimates in Cline are 
not to be taken seriously, the addition of any kind of trade pressure in 
a significant degree could touch off a wider range of sectoral, safe- 
guard moves in the industrial countries in the present climate. It is 
indeed possible to argue that (a) Cline-type estimates are not plausible 
and exaggerate what would happen; (b) there is a great deal of 
absorptive capacity in the market sense in the world economy which 
can readily handle improved export performance resulting from the 
shift of many developing countries to the EP mode of organizing trade; 
and (c) there are powerful new forces in the international political 
economy that may make the protectionist bark worse than the protec- 
tionist bite. Nonetheless, the danger of protectionism does remain 
acute, especially in the present macroeconomic situation of sluggish 
growth and the continuing trade deficit in the United States. The 
capacity of the U.S. executive branch to hold the line against protec- 
tionism has been significantly eroded by the neglect of fiscal deficits 
and the upsurge in congressional support for protection and fair 
trade. The fragility of the situation requires serious attention to other 
policy instruments such as the multinational trade negotiations (MTN), 
as discussed below. 
An important consequence of the second wave of export pessimism, 
which is based on this protectionist threat rather than on the belief in 
market-determined forces that limit export prospects, is that develop- 
ing countries can join in the process of trying to contain this threat 
and thereby change the very prospects for their trade. This suggests 
that they join hands with the industrial countries in efforts such as the 
MTN to contain the threat to the world trading system and to keep 
markets open to expanding trade levels. Shifting to the is strategy, 
therefore, based on export pessimism reflecting protectionist senti- 
ments simply makes no sense from an economic viewpoint unless the 
developing countries are convinced that protectionism is here to stay 
and will be translated into actuality no matter what is done an 
assumption that seems to be wholly unwarranted in light of the 
discussion earlier in this section; A far more sensible policy approach 
seems rather to be to join with the executives of countries that sup- 
port freer trade initiatives, among them certainly the United States, in 
containing the protectionist sentiments through strategies such as en- 
tering into trade negotiations. 
New Arguments 
for the is 
Strategy 
It may be useful to address some new intellectual defenses of the is 
strategy that have recently emerged in the academic literature.35 
Labor Market Imperfections. In recent articles, especially Fields 
(1984), it has been argued that the EP strategy is not appropriate when 
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there are excessively high wages in the economy and that EP countries 
such as Jamaica have done badly by ignoring this caveat. Now, the 
theoretical iterature on market imperfections and optimal policy that 
emerged in the postwar period, with the independent contributions by 
Meade (1951) and Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) setting off the 
spectacular growth of the subject during the 1960s, has shown that- 
factor market imperfections are best addressed by domestic, rather than 
trade, taxes and subsidies.36 It is true, however, that the second-best 
policy measures in such a case could be trade tariffs and subsidies. 
There are two other problems with Fields's argument. First, he does 
not establish that countries such as Jamaica have been following the EP 
strategy in the incentive-related sense that is relevant. As it happens, 
Jamaica certainly has not and has for long periods been in the is mode 
instead. This confusion of concepts and hence conclusions is not con- 
fined to Fields's analysis, but afflicts even the proponents of EP strategy 
in some cases. Second, it is not at all clear from Fields that the high 
wages constitute a market imperfection in the sense required for depar- 
ture from unified exchange rates in the form of the Is strategy. 
In my view, wages are relevant in a different sense that is macro- 
theoretic, rather than microtheoretic as Fields suggests. If overall 
wages are "too high," that can only mean that somehow they, and 
therefore the price level as well, are out of line with the exchange 
rate. That is, the country is suffering from overvaluation. In short, if 
that is so, we have already seen that the country is pursuing an is 
strategy, whether it intends to or not. Therefore, a country simply 
cannot hold on to any EP strategy if it continues to experience exces- 
sive wages. The sustained pursuit of EP, so that investors respond to 
the incentives that EP defines, thus requires a sound macro policy as 
its foundation. Sound macro policies may then also bring, in turn, 
their own other rewards that supplement hose that follow from the 
export-promoting strategy. 
Satisficing Theory of Is. An interesting thesis has been proposed by 
the political scientist Ruggie (1983), which seems to argue that the 
advantage of an EP strategy cannot be enjoyed by many developing 
countries because they simply do not possess the flexibility of resource 
movements and the necessary political capacities to manage such 
flexibility that the pursuit of EP requires. I would call this therefore the 
"satisficing" theory of the is strategy: developing countries in this 
predicament must make do without the gains from trade and efficien- 
cy improvements that EP strategy brings. 
This is a difficult argument to judge since, even if it were valid 
within its premises, I do not find it compelling if such political con- 
straints are equated with the fact of being less developed economi- 
cally. In fact, given the lack of democratic structures with pressure 
group politics and attendant constraints on economic action by the 
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government, it is doubtful whether developing countries are not the 
ones at advantage in this matter! 
Again, is it clear that tensions and distributional conflicts are neces- 
sarily more difficult under an EP strategy? An Is strategy, while insulat- 
ing the economy relatively from external disturbances, may create yet 
more tensions and conflicts if the resulting stultification of income 
expansion accentuates the zero-sum nature of other policy options in 
the system. The correct statement of the Ruggie thesis would then 
seem to be that, in the pursuit of any development strategy, the 
compatibility of it with the political structure and resilience of the 
country needs to be considered. And this caveat needs to be addressed 
not only to the EP proponents. 
Coping with External Instability. A similar economic concern has 
been that, while EP may be better under steady-state conditions, it 
exposes the economy to the downside in the world economy and 
makes it more vulnerable to instability. 
Of course, the downside effects have to be set off against the upside 
effects. When this is done, it is not evident that countries pursuing EP 
strategies are necessarily worse off. As it happens, even the downside 
experience of EP strategy countries during the years after the oil shock 
seems to have been more favorable than the experience of the is 
strategy countries, according to statistical analysis by Balassa (1983 
and 1984). The reason seems to have been their greater capacity to 
deal with external adversity by using export expansion more success- 
fully to adapt to the world slowdown and thus avoiding import 
contraction. 
Conclusion Export promotion policies emerge with success from the detailed 
scrutiny offered in this article. Equally important is the fact that their 
successful adoption will require collaborative and intense efforts to 
ensure that the protectionist threat, recently escalating, is not allowed 
to break out into actual protection on a massive scale. 
The multilateral trade negotiations offer the only reasonable pros- 
pect for maintaining a momentum in favor of a freer world trading 
system. Failure to pursue them successfully, in a spirit of accommoda- 
tion and mutual understanding of constraints and needs, will only 







Figure 1 illustrates, in the two-good model, the definitions of the- 
export-promoting (EP), import-substituting (Is), and ultra-export-pro- 
moting (ultra-EP) trade strategies. 
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AB is the country's production possibility curve. With given inter- 
national prices P*S, equilibrium production would be reached at P* 
under unified exchange rates which ensure that the relative goods 
prices domestically are equal to P*S. Therefore, at P*, we have 
EERX =EERm, where EER refers to the effective exchange rate. This is 
defined as the EP strategy. 
When the incentive to produce the import- 
competing good exceeds that to produce the ex- Figure 1 
portable good, because of a tariff or overvalued Importable 
exchange rates, for example (as shown below), good 
production shifts to Pm. Here, EERx<EERm. This 
is the is strategy. 
If the biased incentive goes in the other direc- 
tion, the relative incentives imply EERX > EERm A EER,< EER, (IS) 
and production shifts to the right of P 0, to say A EER,= EERm (EP) 
Pm. This is defined as the ultra-EP strategy. P* 
S 
Overvalued Exchange Rates and IS Strategy p EER/> EER, (Ultra-EP) 
0 B Exportable 
An overvalued exchange rate will imply the good 
pursuit of the is strategy. Figure 2 demonstrates 
this with the standard supply and demand dia- 
gram for foreign exchange. Figure 2 
If the exchange rate is adjusted to clear the 
market, at S, then EERX = EERm because an ident- y= Rate of exchange 
ical parity applies to both export and import D S 
transactions. But consider now an overvalued ex- 
change rate with exchange controls in place. Un- \ / 
der these circumstances the overvalued exchange y,=EER, 
rate ym leads to OW foreign exchange being 
earned, corresponding to R on the SS curve. This I s 
foreign exchange will then be rationed to users, / 
fetching a market-determined price which ex- y,=EER, R R 
ceeds yx. That price is determined by Q on the D 
DD curve, with Ym representing then the price I 
corresponding to quantity OW. Evidently then, 0 w Foreign 
(Ym-'x)/Yx represents the rate of premium that exchange 
scarce foreign exchange commands in this over- 
valued exchange rate system. 
It is also evident that yx = EERx and Ym = EERm and therefore 
EERX< EERm by the magnitude of the premium on rationed foreign 
exchange. The overvalued exchange rate therefore implies the pursuit 
of an is strategy, whether it is intended or not. 
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The Cost of Protection with Tariff-Seeking 
The new theory of directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) 
and rent-seeking activities, which incorporates lobbying and related 
policy-triggered and policy-influencing activities into formal economic 
theorizing, is illustrated in figure 3 by reference 
Figure 3 to the phenomenon of tariff-seeking lobbying. 
Importable good AB is the production possibility curve if there 
Ak iis no tariff-seeking activity. If, as in conventional 
analysis, we assume an exogenously specified tar- 
A iff, equilibrium production shifts to P (where, of 
Tariff-inclusive course, EERX < EERm). 
A, price ratio Suppose now that this very tariff is instead Al World price ratio arrived at by lobbying which uses up real re- 
p* +,,Psources, diverting these resources from being pro- 
\^ p*, \ ductively employed in producing the two goods. 
Then, the resources that are available to produce 
0 0 B E R B S the two goods in this endogenous tariff, or equiv- 
Exportable 
good alently tariff-seeking, equilibrium can be hypoth- 
etically seen to result in a "net-of-tariff-seeking" 
production possibility curve A1B1 at P. 
The total cost of protection is QS, measured in the conventional 
equivalent variation fashion. By putting the given world price ratio 
tangent to AB at P*, we can then decompose this total cost of protec- 
tion as follows: QS = QR + RS where QR is the conventional cost of 
protection (but measured along the net curve AB) and RS is the 
additional cost of tariff-seeking (representing the cost of diverting 
resources from productive use to tariff-seeking lobbying).37 
Abstract This article evaluates recent arguments against the adoption of an export-promoting 
(EP) trade strategy. It reviews past experience with trade strategies, and distinguishes 
between the old and new export pessimism. The former was based on an (unwarranted) 
assessment of "natural" or market forces. The latter, by contrast, reflects "man-made" 
protectionism. This review finds that an EP policy remains the preferred option provided 
developing countries forcefully join with the industrial countries in strategies to contain 
protectionist threats and to preserve and expand an open trading system. 
Notes 
Thanks are due to Armeane Choksi, Martin Wolf, Constantine Michalopoulos, Sarath 
Rajapatirana, Swaminathan Aiyar, Mohsin Khan, Vittorio Corbo, Adrian Wood, and 
Bela Balassa for helpful comments and to Sunil Gulati, Susan Hume, Douglas Irwin, 
and David Laster for research assistance. 
1. The chief studies were directed by Little, Scitovsky, and Scott (1970) at the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Balassa (1971) at 
the World Bank, Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978) at the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) in the United States, and Donges (1976) at the Kiel Institute 
in Germany. Complementing and overlapping each other, these studies represent a 
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comprehensive analysis of the central question that has preoccupied development 
economists from the very beginning of the discipline. 
2. Among other reviews that complement this article, the reader may consult 
Behrman 1984, Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1979, Findlay 1984, and Srinivasan 1986a and 
1986b. 
3. Prebisch may have subsequently embraced the Nurkse view that primary product 
markets were also price inelastic, according to Balassa. I refer here to the main Prebisch 
thesis as originally propounded and widely attributed to him. 
4. In technical jargon, we have here the classic case for an optimal tariff since the 
terms of trade vary with the level of trade. 
5. This is an example of the dangers of using such regressions, with little underlying 
rationale, for predictive purposes. I have considered this issue at great length (Bhagwati 
1985a, p. 2). 
6. Compare Goldstein and Khan (1982) and Riedel (1984), who analyze this argument 
fully in two splendid and independent articles. Also of importance is the classic 
examination of the issue by Kravis (1970). 
7. See again the results cited in the synthesis volumes of the research projects listed 
in note 1. The Goldstein-Khan (1982) analysis also bears directly on this issue. 
8. Compare Riedel's (1984) discussion of this finding in table 4. 
9. There is a substantial empirical literature on this subject, with important contri- 
butions by Balassa, Grubel, and Lloyd. In addition, recent theoretical work by Dixit, 
Lancaster, Krugman, Helpman, and others has provided the analytical explanation for 
such intraindustry trade. 
10. All these arguments are effectively a rebuttal of Dornbusch's (1986) restatement 
of the limited absorptive capacity thesis for developing country exports, which asserts 
that substantial terms of trade losses would follow from the simultaneous resort to EP 
strategy by many developing countries. 
11. I am indebted to Vittorio Corbo for pointing this out to me. 
12. Compare the comment on Prebisch in Bhagwati (1985a). 
13. The estimated excess of EERX over EERm appeared to be below 10 percent at 
maximum in the few careful cross-section estimates we had. This is reconfirmed for 
Korea in a more recent analysis by Nam (1986). 
14. The strategies have been illustrated in the simplified two-goods model of tradi- 
tional trade theory in figure 1 in the appendix. 
15. See also Krueger's (1980) informal usage of the phrase in this fashion. 
16. Compare Chenery, Shishido, and Watanabe (1962) for one such decomposition. 
For an analytical synthesis and evaluation of alternative measures of import substitution, 
see Desai (1979). 
17. See, in particular, the synthesis volumes by Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978). 
18. Krueger's (1978) synthesis volume also contains similar cross-country regressions 
for the ten semi-industrialized countries in the NBER project. See the extensive review in 
Lal and Rajapatirana (1987). 
19. Balassa's (1978) reestimation of Michaely-type regressions also incorporates the 
Michalopoulos-Jay approach, thus combining the two different methodologies under 
one rubric. 
20. It is well known, of course, that factors that lead to improved efficiency and hence 
to income improvement need not necessarily lead to sustained higher growth rates. 
Thus, in the Harrod-Domar model, where labor supply is slack, a once-for-all improve- 
ment in efficiency will indeed translate into a permanent higher growth rate of income, 
but not so in the steady state in the Solow model, where the growth rate is determined 
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by the growth rate of labor and the rate of technical change. In the text, however, we 
are explaining growth rates over a period of two or three decades, which makes these 
subtleties not particularly relevant, in my judgment. Moreover, it is important to note 
that, for any given growth rate, a more efficient economic regime will require less savings 
(and hence less blood, sweat, and tears) to sustain it than a less efficient economic 
regime. 
21. See Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983, p. 30) for a taxonomy of such lobbying 
activities. 
22. The appendix to this article explains the manner in which the conventional cost 
of distorted production decisions resulting from protection is augmented by the cost of 
tariff-seeking lobbying when the protective tariff is the result of such lobbying. Costs of 
other kinds of lobbying, including the effects of DUP activities such as illegal trade (that 
is, tariff evasion), can be similarly illustrated. If the EP strategy relies not on exchange 
rate flexibility but simply on selective export subsidies to eliminate the bias against 
exports (as in Phase II, delineated in the Bhagwati-Krueger NBER project), the DUP 
activities can be expected to arise extensively in that regime as well. 
23. Krueger's (1974) classic article contains estimates of rent-seeking costs, that is, 
resources spent in chasing premiums or rents on quantitative restrictions. These high 
estimates, up to 15 percent of GNP, are based on the assumption that- rents result in an 
equivalent loss of resources in equilibrium (the so-called one-on-one postulate in rent- 
seeking theory). Recently, computable general equilibrium models have begun to 
incorporate such DUP and rent-seeking activities, so that progress can be expected in 
assessing the magnitude of such costs. Compare Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1981) 
and Grais, de Melo, and Urata (1986). 
24. See the discussion in Balasubramanian (1984) and in Bhagwati (1986a). In private 
communication, Balasubramanian has provided further results in support of this 
hypothesis. 
25. See Bhagwati (1978), where some chapters summarize and evaluate these argu- 
ments with evidence from the ten country studies. 
26. See Bhagwati (1985d) where I review the arguments and the evidence on these 
issues, drawing also on the valuable contributions of Surjit Bhalla, Pranab Bardhan, Paul 
Isenman, Ian Little, Irma Adelman, Montek Ahluwalia, Keith Griffen, Paul Streeten, 
and T. N. Srinivasan, among others. 
27. The investment shunting need occur only insofar as it is necessary to meet value- 
added rules of origin, of course, making the cost of profiting from this porousness even 
less than otherwise. 
28. Of course, the VERS in this instance represent only a partial and suboptimal 
approximation to the free trade solution, which remains the desirable but infeasible 
alternative. Moreover, not all exporting countries are capable of the flexible and shrewd 
response that underlies the model of porous protection sketched above. 
29. This "two-headed" version of governments is what underlies the Feenstra- 
Bhagwati (1982) model of the efficient tariff. There, the model postulates that one branch 
of the government (pursuing special interests) interacts with a protectionist lobby to 
enact a political economy tariff. Then, another branch of the government (pursuing the 
national interest) uses the revenue generated by this tariff to bribe the lobby into 
accepting a less harmful tariff that nonetheless leaves it as well off as under the political 
economy tariff. When this model was presented to a scientific conference in 1978, the 
general reaction was that the model had a "schizophrenic" two-headed government! 
Traditional trade theory is so often modelled in terms of a monolithic government that 
what was obviously a realistic innovation was regarded as a bizarre feature of the model. 
30. See, for example, Olson (1971), Finger (1982), and Mayer (1984). 
31. See the report by Miller (1985). 
32. Helleiner (1977) and most recently Lavergne and Helleiner (1985) have argued 
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that multinationals have become active agents exercising political pressure in favor of 
free trade. The structure of trade barriers has been related to patterns of DFI by Helleiner 
but the later work by Lavergne finds this relationship to be fairly weak. This hypothesis 
and research do not extend to the potential DFI effects in favor of freer trade (which 
would occur if DFI becomes an alternative response to import competition), which is 
discussed in Bhagwati (1982b and 1986a) and in the text. 
33. In fact, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan has recently 
completed a survey of Japanese DFI abroad and found that a large fraction of the 
respondents cited reasons of the quid pro quo variety to explain their investment 
decisions. I am indebted to Professor Shishido of the International University of Japan 
for this reference. See also the theoretical modeling of such quid pro quo DFI in Bhagwati, 
Brecher, Dinopoulos, and Srinivasan (1987) and in Bhagwati and Dinopoulos (1986), the 
former using perfectly competitive structure and the latter using monopoly and duopoly 
structures instead. 
34. See also the critique offered by Ranis (198S). Cline (1985) basically defends his 
position by arguing that the high ratios of trade to GNP typical of Far Eastern economies 
are likely to trigger difficulties and that he should not have been read to mean that the 
EP strategy would necessarily lead to such phenomenally high trade growth rates and 
trade ratios. 
35. In the following, I select for treatment only the most important such arguments, 
given the central theme of this paper. For a more comprehensive review of recent 
arguments for protection, including those applying to industrial countries-as in 
Kaldor's (1966) argument for protection to prevent British deindustrialization or 
Seabury's (1983) advocacy of protection to prevent American deindustrialization for 
defense reasons-see my analyses in Bhagwati (1985c, 1985e, and 1986c). For a different 
emphasis, more skeptical of antiprotectist arguments and EP strategy, see Streeten (1982). 
36. The theory has been synthesized in Bhagwati (1971), and there is also a splendid 
short treatment by Srinivasan (1987) in his entry on distortions for The New Palgrave. 
37. For the original analysis of this problem, see Bhagwati (1980). Further discussion 
of the question can be found in Bhagwati, Brecher, and Srinivasan (1984). 
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